



the impact of new contracts on
football referees’ performance
Until the introduction of salary contracts in the early 2000s,
all referees in English professional football were paid a
match fee for each game they officiated. The change was
introduced to ‘professionalise’ the top tier of refereeing.
The new contracts offered greater income security to
referees. Under the match fee system, referees could be
dropped from the list of officials immediately following a
poor performance, whereas the salary contracts were
initially renewable after two years (and subsequently
renewable annually).
The salaries also offered considerably more money 
than match fees. In return, salaried referees were
required to attend fortnightly off-the-job training sessions
to improve their fitness and ability to make the right
decisions on the pitch.
The introduction of salary contracts was motivated by the
huge growth in revenues resulting from lucrative television
deals and by the increasing scrutiny of referees' decisions
in the media and among fans. The employer – the
Professional Game Match Officials Board – was intent on
driving up standards through salary contracts.
Economic theory suggests that the employer could be
doing the right thing. A classic review of research on
incentives and worker performance notes that when a
worker is paid a salary, ‘despite the fact that there is no
immediate relation between pay and performance, he is
likely to have incentives to exert effort because good
performance will improve future contracts. Such
reputational concerns imply that effort exertion can occur
without explicit pay-for-performance contracts’
(Prendergast, 1999).
The introduction of high paying contracts could also have a
second impact, attracting better quality workers. Theory
suggests that the result will be some ‘sorting’ of workers,
in which better ones seek out the salary contracts and 
less able workers remain on match fees or leave the
occupation entirely.
Our research takes advantage of the fact that when salary
contracts were introduced, referees officiating in the
Championship – the second tier of English professional
football – continued to be paid match fees. This gives us a
‘natural experiment’, in which some workers move to
salary contracts and others continue to be paid under the
old system.
By comparing the relative performance of referees in the
Premier League and Championship in the pre-salary period
with their relative performance in the post-salary period (a
method known as difference-in-differences), we can
estimate the impact of the salary contracts.
This approach would be problematic if Premier League
referees remained in the top tier throughout and thus
obtained salaries, while Championship officials remained
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on match fees in the second tier throughout. But this is
not what happened. All referees in both divisions became
eligible for the new contracts, and some referees
officiated in both divisions at various points.
There are two other concerns that might affect our ability
to draw inferences about the impact of salaries on
referees’ performance. The first is the possibility that other
changes occurred at the same time as the switch to
salaries, which may have had different effects on the
performance of referees in the Premier League compared
with the Championship. But our analysis suggests that this
is not the case.
The second concern is that the employer offered the
salary contracts to the most able referees so that the
contract is simply an indicator of a more able referee. 
We are able to deal with this problem by controlling for
referee ‘fixed effects’.
Our data are virtually all the matches played in the top
two divisions of English football in the 12 seasons
between 1997/98 and 2008/09 (we have data for 11,169
of the 11,184 matches). They include all 168 referees
officiating at these games over the period. Our measure of
referees’ performance is the number of yellow and red
cards that they issue in a game.
Yellow cards are issued as a warning to a player when he
has broken the rules, either by fouling an opponent,
handling the ball or for showing dissent. A red card is
shown if the player commits a second offence worthy of a
yellow card. Red cards can also be shown for a particularly
egregious first offence, such as violent conduct  or a foul
that directly prevents a goal-scoring opportunity. Red cards
lead to the player being sent off and suspended from
subsequent games.
Issuing many cards is often a sign that the referee has lost
control of the game. Good referees are able to deal with
most incidents without brandishing cards by
communicating firmly with players from the outset.
Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that Premier League
officials hoped that the introduction of salary contracts
would improve communication between referees and
players. Other studies have shown a high negative
correlation between the number of cards awarded and
subjective assessments of referees’ performance by expert
panels (Frick et al, 2008).
We find improvements in the performance of referees
among those who moved onto salary contracts relative to
those who do not. The salaried referees issued an average
of half a card less per game. This is a reduction of around
one sixth since, on average in our data, referees show
three cards per game.
The finding is robust to controls for referee fixed effects,
which indicates that the result is not driven by salary
contracts being awarded to better referees, although this
does account for part of the effect. Nor is it sensitive to
workers sorting into or out of the profession. Thus it
appears that one can improve officiating at football games
by using good personnel economics.
This article summarises ‘Do Salaried Workers Perform Better
than Piece Rate Workers?’ by Alex Bryson, Babatunde Buraimo
and Rob Simmons, a forthcoming CEP Discussion Paper.
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